Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The Three-Gap Model examines the determinants of low-quality health care by examining the patterns and determinants of three gaps. Using four measures of performance-target performance, actual performance, capacity to perform, and knowledge to perform-this paper defines three gaps for each health worker: the gap between target performance and what they have the knowledge to do (the know gap), the gap between their knowledge and their capacity to perform (the know-can gap), and the gap between their capacity and what they actually do (the can-do gap). The paper demonstrates how the patterns of these gaps across health workers in a sample can be used to diagnose failures in the system as well as evaluate the outcomes of policy experiments. Using data on pediatric care from hospitals in Liberia, the paper illustrates how the model can be used to investigate the potential for improvements in the quality of care from several possible policy interventions. The analysis of the relationships between these gaps across health workers in a health system help to paint a better picture of the determinants of performance and can assist policy makers in choosing relevant policies to improve health worker performance.

Health Care Evaluation --- Health Care Services Industry --- Health Service Management and Delivery --- Health, Nutrition and Population --- Industry --- Pay for Performance --- Pay for Quality --- Pediatric Care --- Pharmaceuticals and Pharmacoeconomics --- Pharmaceuticals Industry

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Most studies of intrahousehold resource allocation examine outcomes and do not consider the decision-making process by which those outcomes are achieved. We conduct an original lab-in-the-field experiment on the decision-making process of married couples over the allocation of rival and non-rival household goods. The experiment measures individual preferences over allocations and traces the process of consultation, communication, deferral, and accommodation by which couples implement these preferences. We find few differences in individual preferences over allocations of goods. However, wives and husbands have strong preferences over process: women prefer to defer budget allocation decisions to their husband even when deferral is costly and is not observed by the husband; the reverse is true for men. Our study follows a randomized controlled trial that ended a year earlier and gave large cash transfers over fifteen months to half of the women in the study. We estimate the effect of treatment on the demand for agency among women and find that the receipt of cash transfers does not change women's bargaining process except in a secret condition when the decision to defer is shrouded from her husband: only in that case does the cash transfer increase women's expressed demand for agency.